

SECRETDDI/ACIS
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FRP: .2.3. . .6. .

STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: CRU, NIO/WE, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S, OEA/CH,
 OEA/CH/DOM-2, OEA/CH/FOR, OGI/DD/E, OGI/GD/EA, OGI/ISI/WP, OOE/ASZ,
 OOE/EI/PS, OOE/WE, OSA/PA/S, OSWR/TTC/S, PLANFAC-E (), RF, SOV/CS,
 SOV/CS/CA, SOV/CS/E/E, SOV/CS/E/P, SOV/CS/S/M, SOV/CS/Y, SOV/PA/C,
 SOV/PA/F-4, SOV/SF, SOV/SFD, SOV/SFE, SOV/SFO, SOV/TF, SOV/TFA, ZSAG/MEB,
 ZSAG/PPB, ZSAG/SEB, FILE, EUR/RR, EUR/SA, SE/RR, SE/XEU, A/DDI/SP,
 D/OCR-3, D/OSWR, DC/OOE/EI, DDI/ACIS, DSD/DEB, IAD/SO, ICS/OHC/EU,
 NED/NTMB, NED/NWB, NICAG/II, NICAG/SOV, NICAG/SP, NIO/GPF, NIO/PE,
 NIO/SP, NIO/USSR, NPIC/SSFD, OIA/MS, OSWR/CIG, PPD, SAG/MEB, SAG/PPB,
 SAG/SEB-3, (33/W)

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 FM USMISSION GENEVA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5662
 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6802
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 8814
 RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE
 BT
 S E C R E T GENEVA 11856

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ROSTOW; SHAPE/FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD

USINF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PARM, INF
 SUBJECT: (U) INF: END-OF-ROUND ASSESSMENT

1. THIS IS INF-359. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. AS EXPECTED, THIRD ROUND OF INF NEGOTIATIONS
 HAS PRODUCED NO FORMAL SOVIET MOVEMENT ON CENTRAL
 SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT ALTERS FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF
 SOVIET POSITION. IN EFFECT, SOVIETS MAINTAINED AN
 APPROACH THAT WOULD BLOCK PERSHING II AND GLCM DEPLOY-
 MENTS WHILE PERMITTING USSR TO RETAIN LARGE SS-20 FORCES.

3. "NEW" PROPOSALS TABLED BY SOVIETS DURING ROUND
 APPEAR INTENDED TO SUPPORT SOVIET CLAIM OF NEGOTIATING
 "FLEXIBILITY." AT SAME TIME, SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE
 ADJUSTING CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION TO A "CARROT
 AND STICK" APPROACH. THE "CARROT" WOULD SEEK TO APPEAL
 TO SOME BASIC EUROPEAN CONCERNS BY REDUCING SS-20'S IN
 EUROPE TO SUCH A LEVEL THAT EUROPEAN PUBLICS COULD
 RATIONALIZE THAT U.S. LRINF DEPLOYMENTS WERE NO LONGER
 REQUIRED. THE "STICK" WOULD THREATEN COUNTER-DEPLOYMENTS
 BOTH IN EUROPE AND AGAINST U.S. TERRITORY SHOULD U.S.
 DEPLOYMENTS PROCEED. SOVIET TACTICS CONCURRENTLY APPEAR
 TO BE DESIGNED TO EXPLOIT DESIRE ON PART OF MANY
 EUROPEANS NOT TO DEPLOY WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE PROCEEDING
 WITH SOME PROSPECT OF AGREEMENT.

4. FOR ITS PART, USDEL HAS STRESSED THE REQUIREMENT THAT
 SOVIETS ADDRESS LEGITIMATE NATO SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH
 PROMPTED DECEMBER 1979 DECISION. WE HAVE CONTINUED TO

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ADVANCE RATIONALE FOR ZERO-ZERO SOLUTION AS OPTIMUM BASIS FOR AGREEMENT AND TO REBUT SOVIET POSITION. INTRODUCTION OF AMPLIFIED MOU ON AGREED DATA BASE AND VERIFICATION MATERIALS (AREAS WHERE THERE IS SOME COMMON GROUND BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS) AND U.S. EFFORTS ON DATA AND TREATY LANGUAGE GAVE US OPPORTUNITY TO RECORD U.S. READINESS AND DESIRE TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AT ALL LEVELS, EVEN IF DIFFERENCES OVER CENTRAL ISSUES COULD NOT BE RESOLVED DURING CURRENT ROUND.

5. DELEGATION SEES NEED TO DEVELOP NEGOTIATING AND PUBLIC STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH SOVIET "CARROT AND STICK" APPROACH. END SUMMARY.

6. ON MAJOR ASPECTS, FORMAL SOVIET POSITION SHOWS LITTLE CHANGE:

-- ON CENTRAL ISSUE OF LRINF MISSILES, SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PUSH AN APPROACH THAT WOULD BLOCK PERSHING II AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS WHILE ALLOWING USSR TO MAINTAIN LARGE FORCE OF SS-20'S IN EUROPE.

-- ON ISSUE OF INCLUSION OF THIRD-COUNTRY FORCES, SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST ON SUBTRACTION OF UK AND FRENCH FORCES FROM CEILING ON UNITED STATES "MEDIUM-RANGE" FORCES.

-- ON AIRCRAFT ISSUE, SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST ON INCLUSION OF AIRCRAFT.

-- ON GEOGRAPHY ISSUE, SOVIETS CONTINUE TO INSIST SYSTEMS BE LIMITED ON BASIS OF LOCATION AND "INTENDED USE" RATHER THAN ON BASIS OF CAPABILITY WITHOUT REGARD TO LOCATION.

7. SOVIETS HAVE USED THIRD ROUND TO INTRODUCE SOME "NEW" VARIATIONS ON THEIR BASIC LINE. AS ALTERNATIVE TO THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL THAT NATO AND USSR EACH REDUCE TO 300 "MEDIUM-RANGE" SYSTEMS IN EUROPE, SOVIETS PROPOSED TO REDUCE SOVIET FORCES TO LEVEL EQUAL TO AGGREGATE OF UK AND FRENCH FORCES (255 SYSTEMS BY SOVIET COUNT), WHICH SOVIETS CLAIM WOULD REDUCE "U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION" TO ZERO. SOVIETS ALSO PROPOSED QUANTITATIVE COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON MISSILES WITH RANGES BETWEEN 500 AND 1000 KILOMETERS. MOST SIGNIFICANT WAS SOVIET INTRODUCTION OF MISSILE SUB-CEILING.

8. WHILE BASIC PARAMETERS OF SOVIET APPROACH REMAIN THE SAME, SOVIETS HAVE POSITIONED THEMSELVES TO CLAIM CREDIT FOR "FLEXIBILITY," WHICH WE CAN EXPECT THEM TO CLAIM CONTRASTS WITH U.S. "INTRANSIGENCE" ON ZERO-ZERO. SOVIET

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DELEGATION HAS ALREADY MADE THIS POINT IN PLENARIES AND INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS; IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT THIS THEME TO SURFACE IN SOVIET PUBLIC CAMPAIGN.

9. MISSILE SUB-CEILING LEVEL USUALLY SUGGESTED BY SOVIETS WOULD ROUGHLY EQUAL NUMBER OF UK AND FRENCHBALLISTIC MISSILES. THIS WOULD MEAN A REDUCTION OF PRESENT SS-20/SS-5/SS-4 FORCE IN EUROPE FROM ABOUT 500 MISSILES WITH 1000 WARHEADS TO ABOUT 150 MISSILES WITH UNDER 500 WARHEADS, LESS THAN NUMBER OF WARHEADS CARRIED BY SS-4/SS-5 FORCE OF EARLY 1970'S. SUCH A SUBCEILING, HOWEVER, WOULD STILL LEAVE SOVIETS WITH LARGE SS-20 FORCE, BOTH IN EUROPE AND EAST OF 80 DEGREES EAST, CAPABLE OF REACHING TARGETS IN EUROPE OR EXERTING POLITICAL INFLUENCE ON EUROPE AND STILL LEAVE U.S. WITH ZERO LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE.

10. SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAVE ATTACHED MOST SIGNIFICANCE

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TO MISSILE SUB-CEILING. WE BELIEVE IMPACT ON U.S./NATO ARGUMENTATION, THAT ORIGINAL SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT SOVIETS TO DEPLOY UP TO 300 SS-20'S IN EUROPE PROBABLY STIMULATED THIS MOVE. THIS POSITIONS SOVIETS TO CLAIM CREDIT -- BOTH IN NEGOTIATIONS AND PUBLICLY -- FOR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE SS-20'S IN EUROPE BY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER. THEY PROBABLY CALCULATE THAT SUCH A WILLINGNESS ON THEIR PART WOULD PROVE ATTRACTIVE TO SOME ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND MUCH OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC, WHICH SOVIETS LIKELY BELIEVE WOULD WELCOME MOVE THAT OBVIATES U.S. DEPLOYMENTS.

11. DURING ROUND, SOVIETS HAVE ALSO INCREASED THE THREAT ELEMENT OF THEIR APPROACH SHOULD U.S. PROCEED WITH DEPLOYMENTS. SOVIETS HAVE EMPHASIZED THEY ARE PREPARED TO TAKE MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES IN RESPONSE TO NATO DEPLOYMENTS. WE BELIEVE THESE COULD TAKE FORM OF RESUMED SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AND INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE. THEY HAVE SUGGESTED A DOUBLE "STICK," ONE BEING THREAT FULLY TO OFFSET U.S. DEPLOYMENTS AS THEY AFFECT EUROPE, SECOND BEING THREAT TO MAKE TERRITORY OF U.S. AS VULNERABLE TO SOVIET SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS AS SOVIET TERRITORY IS TO U.S. "FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS" (INCLUDING HINTS OF DEPLOYMENTS IN CUBA). SOVIETS HAVE IMPLIED THAT BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD THEN BE SHIFTED TO TRADE OF GLCM/PERSHING II FOR NEW SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS VICE TRADE OF GLCM/PERSHING II FOR EXISTING SS-20'S.

12. SOVIETS HAVE THUS SET THEMSELVES UP TO TAKE "CARROT AND STICK" APPROACH, IN NEGOTIATIONS AND AT APPROPRIATE TIME, WITH NATO GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS. ON ONE HAND, SOVIETS COULD OFFER -- IF PERSHING II AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS WERE CANCELLED -- TO REDUCE SS-20 FORCE IN EUROPE TO LEVEL OF UK AND FRENCH FORCES (WHICH, THEY WOULD POINT OUT, WOULD RESULT IN FEWER LRINF MISSILE WARHEADS IN EUROPE THAN ON SS-4/SS-5 FORCE IN EARLY 1970'S). ON OTHER HAND, SHOULD U.S. DEPLOYMENTS PROCEED, SOVIETS WOULD THREATEN ADDITIONAL SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS AND INTRODUCTION OF NEW SOVIET SYSTEMS TO "RESTORE BALANCE."

13. WE HAVE NOTED DURING ROUND THAT SOVIETS HAVE MODIFIED THEIR LINE TO SAY THEY EXPECT NATO MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AND DEPLOYMENTS BEGUN IN LATE 1983. KVITSINSKIY AND OTHER SOVIET DELEGATION MEMBERS HAVE SAID THIS IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, AND BREZHNEV ANNOUNCED "PRACTICAL PREPARATIONS" IN EUROPE ARE UNDER WAY. THIS MAY REFLECT FACT THAT NEW GOVERNMENTS IN FRG AND NETHERLANDS HAVE SOLIDIFIED NATO SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYMENTS. SOVIETS MAY, HOWEVER, HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEIR BEST TACTICAL APPROACH IS TO STATE THEY ASSUME DEPLOYMENTS WILL GO FORWARD ON SCHEDULE, THAT SOVIET POSITION PERMITS ACHIEVEMENT OF REASONABLE AGREEMENT, THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT IS BEING BLOCKED BY U.S., AND THAT DIRE CONSEQUENCES ARE THUS CERTAIN TO ENSUE FROM DEPLOYMENT.

14. APPROACH WHICH SOVIETS HAVE INFORMALLY SUGGESTED, BUILDING ON FORMAL SUB-CEILING PROPOSAL, MAY INDICATE A MORE SERIOUS ATTITUDE ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. PERHAPS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE, IT COULD LAY A PLAUSIBLE BASIS FOR THEIR POLITICAL ACTION PROGRAM TO PREVENT OR AT LEAST INHIBIT U.S. DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD THERE BE NO AGREEMENT.

15. WHILE THEIR COMMENTS HAVE BEEN INFORMAL, IT IS NOT DIFFICULT -- BASED ON RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS (PRIMARILY KVITSINSKIY AND DETINOV) -- TO ENVISAGE A SOVIET APPROACH INCORPORATING FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

-- A CEILING OF APPROXIMATELY 150 ON SOVIET "MEDIUM-

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RANGE" MISSILES IN EUROPE (INCLUDING THE 45 SS-20'S

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AT VERKHNYAYA SALDA AS BEING IN EUROPE) COUPLED WITH
A BAN ON DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE;

-- SEPARATE CEILINGS ON U.S. AND SOVIET "MEDIUM-RANGE"
AIRCRAFT, HIGH ENOUGH ON U.S. SIDE SO AS NOT TO FORCE
REDUCTIONS IN U.S. DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE
AND HIGH ENOUGH ON SOVIET SIDE TO ASSURE EQUALITY WITH
COMPARABLE NATO FORCES; AND

-- COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE MISSILES.

IN ADDITION, SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS CEILING
ON SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS IN EASTERN USSR AND COLLATERAL
CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE AIRCRAFT.

16. WHILE SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE A FAR CRY FROM
ZERO-ZERO, SOVIETS COULD ARGUE IT ADDRESSES A NUMBER
OF CONCERNS RAISED BY U.S. DURING NEGOTIATIONS:

-- IT WOULD NOT REDUCE U.S. DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN
EUROPE, ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR CONVENTIONAL ROLES AS WELL
AS NUCLEAR.

-- IT WOULD ENTAIL SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET
LRINF MISSILES IN EUROPE, INCLUDING A SIGNIFICANT
NUMBER OF SS-20'S AND ALL SS-4'S AND SS-5'S. SOVIETS
HAVE 243 SS-20'S IN EUROPE OR AT VERKHNYAYA SALDA;
A CEILING OF AROUND 150 WOULD MEAN REDUCTION OF A
THIRD OF THOSE SS-20'S. THEY COULD CLAIM THEY WOULD
BE REQUIRED TO DESTROY RATHER THAN WITHDRAW SOME
SS-20'S DEPENDING ON PERCENTAGE TO BE AGREED OF
SYSTEMS TO BE REDUCED WHICH COULD BE WITHDRAWN RATHER
THAN DESTROYED (SOVIET TREATY PROVIDES THAT DESTRUCTION
WILL BE PRIMARY METHOD OF REDUCTION). MOREOVER, SUCH
A WITHDRAWAL COULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH AN EFFORT FOR A
LESS HOSTILE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. ELIMINATION OF
THESE SS-20'S AND REMAINING SS-4'S AND SS-5'S IN EUROPE
WOULD MEAN REDUCTION OF SOVIET LRINF MISSILE FORCE IN/
NEAR EUROPE FROM 500 MISSILES WITH 1000 WARHEADS TO
AROUND 150 MISSILES WITH APPROXIMATELY 450 WARHEADS.
WELL BELOW NUMBER OF SS-4/SS-5 WARHEADS DEPLOYED IN
EUROPE IN EARLY 1970'S.

-- SOVIETS COULD ALSO STATE THAT IF U.S. AGREED TO
ABOVE, SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS LIMITS ON
SHORTER RANGE NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE AND ON
"MEDIUM-RANGE" SYSTEMS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE.

17. THOUGH ABOVE IS BASED ON EXTRAPOLATION OF SOVIET
COMMENTS, WE BELIEVE IT IS LIKELY SOVIET COURSE. THEY
COULD USE SUCH AN APPROACH AS A "CARROT" TO CONTRAST WITH
"STICK" OF MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES SHOULD PERSHING II
AND GLCM DEPLOYMENT TAKE PLACE. IT ALSO WOULD SERVE
TO PORTRAY SOVIET "FLEXIBILITY."

18. FOR ITS PART, USDEL USED CURRENT ROUND TO STRESS TO
SOVIETS THE REQUIREMENT TO ADDRESS OUR LEGITIMATE
SECURITY CONCERNS. WE CONTINUED TO ADVANCE THE
RATIONALE FOR ZERO-ZERO AS OPTIMUM BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT
AND TO POINT UP FLAWS IN SOVIET APPROACH.

19. ENCOUNTERING SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS
WERE STALEMATED, WE WERE ABLE TO USE INTRODUCTION OF
AMPLIFIED MOU ON AGREED DATA BASE, DISCUSSION OF
VERIFICATION AND TABLING OF DESTRUCTION MEASURES TO

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GOOD ADVANTAGE. NOTING THERE WAS COMMON GROUND BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES IN THOSE AREAS, WE MADE POINT THAT EVEN IF PROGRESS WAS NOT POSSIBLE ON CENTRAL ISSUES DURING CURRENT ROUND, U.S. WAS READY AND DESIRED TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD ON ANY AND ALL LEVELS WHERE PROGRESS WAS POSSIBLE. WE ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PUSH WORK IN TREATY TEXT AND DATA EXPERTS GROUPS, MAKING SOME PROGRESS BUT NORMALLY RUNNING UP AGAINST SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO MOVE FORWARD. WE BELIEVE RECORD SHOWS CLEARLY THAT U.S. TRIED TO MAKE PROGRESS AT ALL LEVELS, BUT THOSE EFFORTS ONLY HAD LIMITED SUCCESS DUE TO SOVIET REFUSAL TO CONSIDER MOVEMENT SO LONG AS U.S. CONTINUED TO PROPOSE ZERO-ZERO.

20. AS WE APPROACH ROUND FOUR, A NUMBER OF ISSUES WILL HAVE TO BE ADDRESSED. IT APPEARS THAT SOVIETS COULD BE TAKING SERIOUSLY PROSPECT THAT DEPLOYMENTS ARE GOING TO TAKE PLACE IN ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT. IF OUR READING OF SOVIET DELEGATION COMMENTS IS CORRECT, THEY THEREFORE MAY BE AS WILLING NOW TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF WESTERN CONCERNS AS AT ANY LATER

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DATE. SO WE SHOULD HAVE A STRATEGY TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO GO FURTHER AND TO MAKE FULL EFFORT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THOSE CONCERNS.

21. SOVIETS HAVE SAID THAT U.S. RESPONSE TO THEIR NEW PROPOSALS (AND IMPLICITLY, THE "STICK" ALTERNATIVE) WILL BE TAKEN AS A SIGN OF U.S. SERIOUSNESS. IT MAY BE NOTEWORTHY THAT SOVIETS HAVE CHARACTERIZED FOURTH ROUND AS CRUCIAL. WHILE WE SHOULD NOT JUMP TO MEET THIS SOVIET "LITMUS TEST," WE NEED TO BE WARY. ROUND FOUR MAY HOLD MORE POTENTIAL PITFALLS FOR U.S. THAN PREVIOUS ROUNDS, AND SOVIETS WILL BE ALERT TO PLAY TO THEIR ADVANTAGE EVENTS OUTSIDE OF GENEVA SUCH AS FRG ELECTIONS AND IMPENDING ARRIVAL OF FIRST GLCM EQUIPMENT.

22. WE WILL NEED TO DEVELOP STRATEGY TO COUNTER SOVIET POSSIBLE EXPLOITATION OF THEIR "CARROT AND STICK" APPROACH WITH ALLIES AND PUBLIC WHICH COULD EMERGE AT ANY TIME. TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH SUCH EXPLOITATION WILL BE CRUCIAL GIVEN THAT THE "CARROT" COULD APPEAR ATTRACTIVE TO BOTH NATO GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS, PARTICULARLY WHEN CONTRASTED WITH THE "STICK." NITZE
END OF MESSAGE

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